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Specificity of the Bipartisan Consensus on Innovation Policy in the USA

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to assess the prospects for the development of US innovation policy at the present stage. **The methods** of statistical and comparative analysis, deductive analysis, as well as analysis of historical data and the current state of the problem, are used. The paper considers the evolution of the bipartisan consensus of the Republican and Democratic parties of the United States on innovation policy issues. The current study presents an analysis of the system of state regulation of innovation policy in the United States, the specifics of the approaches of the Republican and Democratic parties to the problem of ensuring leadership in the global innovation sphere in the context of intense competition with China. **The results** show that innovation policy is considered by both system-forming parties of the United States as a priority for ensuring national security and maintaining the leadership of the United States in the global economy, the international technological ecosystem, which necessitates revising approaches to its state regulation and developing key drivers for accelerating scientific and technological progress, which the state intends to focus on in matters of stimulating innovative activity in the country computing, technological competition between the United States and China.

Keywords: Republican Party; Democratic Party; USA; innovation policy; R&D; advanced technologies; artificial intelligence; skilled immigration; quantum computing; US technological competition with China

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ОРИГИНАЛЬНАЯ СТАТЬЯ

Специфика двухпартийного консенсуса по инновационной политике в США

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АННОТАЦИЯ

Целью исследования является оценка перспектив развития инновационной политика США на современном этапе. Использованы **методы** статистического и сравнительного анализа, дедуктивного анализа, а также анализ исторических данных и текущего состояния проблемы. В работе рассматривается эволюция двухпартийного консенсуса республиканской и демократической партий США в вопросах инновационной политики. В исследовании представлен анализ системы государственного регулирования инновационной политики в Соединенных Штатах, особенности подходов республиканской и демократической партий к проблематике обеспечения лидерства в мировой инновационной сфере в контексте острой конкуренции с КНР. **Результаты** исследования показывают, что инновационная политика рассматривается обеими системообразующими партиями США как приоритет обеспечения национальной безопасности и сохра-

нения лидерства Соединенных Штатов в мировой экономике и международной технологической экосистеме, что обусловливает необходимость пересмотра подходов к ее государственному регулированию и выработке ключевых драйверов ускорения научно-технического прогресса, на которые государство намерено делать акцент в вопросах стимулирования инновационной активности в стране.
Ключевые слова: республиканская партия; демократическая партия; США; инновационная политика; НИОКР; передовые технологии; искусственный интеллект; квалифицированная иммиграция; квантовые вычисления; технологическая конкуренция США с Китаем

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Introduction

Research and innovation policies in the United States are defined by both federal and state authorities. The president and administration of the White House act as the central executive body, determining the priorities of the state innovation policy [1–3]. However, as a rule, the president alone does not make appropriate political decisions. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) acts in this regard as an advisory council to the president of the country on science, research and development. J. Biden was the first president to appoint a science adviser to his cabinet. The Congress, in its capacity as a legislature, plays a critical role in shaping policy principles for national research and innovation. Legislative work takes place in the context of ongoing congressional consultations and debates with The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, The United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and The Congressional Research Service. The president and Congress jointly determine the federal budget, including R&D allocations. At the state level, financing is mainly accomplished through public-commercial partnerships involving scientific, educational, public organizations and private spending. U.S. national high-tech competitiveness has become a bipartisan priority because of China's growing innovation potential, as well as pandemic-related disruptions in the country's economy-critical supply chains. This consensus has led to restrictions on access to advanced American technologies from abroad and priority investments in the development and implementation of innovations within the country in the field of improving data privacy, cyberspace security and artificial intelligence (AI) [4–6, 7].

Overview of the literature on the specifics of the bipartisan consensus on US innovation policy

Official strategic documents adopted by both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past decade consider innovative policies as one of the decisive tools for ensuring US national security.[1] Democratic policy documents claim that in recent years the United States has become one of the few major countries in the world to reduce investment in R&D. The challenges of the current moment require a significant review of this situation and increased government spending in new sources of American global leadership.[2] Republicans call for reducing the state's regulatory functions in the economy and tax system, ensuring fair trade deals, increasing the production of reliable and abundant cheap energy by removing market-distorting restrictions on oil, natural gas and coal, supporting innovation, prioritizing American producers over all other foreign counterparties, and returning critical supply chains to the United States.[3] The US innovation strategy's policy nature is provided by both parties at the federal level. Its implementation is a response to economic, technological and military challenges from China, including China's desire to become a high-tech power and modernize its armed forces by 2035, which will turn China into a world-class military

[1] National Security Strategy. October 12, 2022. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf/ (accessed on 03.11.2024).

[2] Annual growth rate of expenditure on research and development (R&D) in China from 2000 to 2024. URL: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1465710/research-and-development-expenditure-growth-in-china/ (accessed on 15.01.2024).

[3] The Republican Party Platform, 2024. URL: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2024-republican-party-platform (accessed on 22.12.2024).

power. Between 1991 and 2016, China increased its R&D spending 30 times. The US share of global R&D spending decreased from 41% in 2000 to 28% in 2018, while China's share in the same period increased from 4.5% to more than 25%. Recently, the total costs in China for R&D are approximately equal to the US indicator and significantly exceed the level of the European Union (EU). In 2009, China surpassed Japan as the second-largest R&D investor in the world. In 2018, China spent $ 554.3 billion on R&D, only slightly below the US level. China's share of global R&D of 26.3% approached the US share of 27.6%. Over the next years, China plans to invest an additional $ 1.4 trillion in public and private funds in so-called next-generation technologies.

Although the United States has always competed with other innovative countries, technological rivalry with China has a fundamental difference. Countries with the highest technological level of national economies, are to one degree or another, the closest allies and partners of the United States [8–10]. The political efforts of the United States to selectively update its production base and promote the development of new systemic solutions in the field of innovation policy are now crucial [7, 9]. The Republican and Democratic parties share the view that the United States should significantly increase investment in maintaining its competitive advantage as a global leader in innovation and take large-scale measures to address the risks to competition posed by technology platforms [1–3, 11].

Findings and discussion: the priorities of the innovative policies of the Democratic and Republican parties

The US continues to be the world's leading country in R&D spending, but this dominance is highly volatile amid China's tremendous success in building innovation capacity, identified by the People's Republic of China (PRC) leadership as the top political national priority.[4] The ranking of the Global Innovation Index 2024, which classifies world economies by their innovative capabilities according to 80 indicators, grouped by input and output innovative resources and covering multidimensional aspects of innovation, shows that the United States ranks third among 133 countries, 4th in innovative resources, and 5th in terms of innovation performance and leads in nine indicators (four less than in 2023) — in global corporate investments in R&D, the assessment of unicorns and the intensity of intangible assets, ranked lowest in infrastructure (30th), institutions (17th) and human capital and research (12th).[5] The United States is the world leader in funding for research in absolute terms, but only tenth in terms of appropriations for basic research. In 2000, they fell from the fifth position among OECD countries in terms of R&D costs in GDP to the eighth in 2019, when the federal government spent only $ 83.4 billion on basic and applied research. About 16.3% of came from computer science, mathematics and physical sciences. Federal support for R&D relative to GDP has been steadily declining since the early 1960s. The lowest level was reached in 2018 at 0.61% of GDP. To restore federal funding for R&D in the ratio of GDP to levels averaged nationally in the 1980s, it should increase funding by about 80%, or 100 billion dollars a year. Total federal spending on research and development should be increased from 0.7 to 1.4% of GDP over five years from about $ 150 billion to $ 230 billion annually. The most realistic is the increase in the level of federal funding for R&D to the average after 1976, which amounted to 1% of GDP. The presidency of B. Obama was also set, but the goal of 3% of GDP was never achieved.[6] The main advantages of innovation in the United States are software spending, as a percentage of GDP (rank 1) and intangible asset intensity (rank 1).

China, the largest non-OECD economy, financed 27% of R&D investments globally in 2021, representing 98% of non-OECD investments. The US funded 32% of global R&D in 2021. China shows the largest increase in R&D spending, followed by Korea and Taiwan. The US remains in 5th place, with an average annual growth in

[4] China's 14th Five-Year Plan, English-translated outline. URL: https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202203/P020220315511326748336.pdf (accessed on 22.01.2025).

[5] U.S. R&D and Innovation in a Global Context: The 2024 Data Update. URL: https://www.aaas.org/news/us-rd-and-innovation-global-context-2024-data-update; OECD Data Portal. URL: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 12.02.2025).

[6] Donald Trump Says U.S. Never Hit 3% GDP Growth Under Obama — But It's Misleading. fortune.com. August 31, 2017. URL: https://fortune.com/2017/08/30/donald-trump-springfield-mo-3-gdp/ (accessed on 14.11.2024).

R&D spending of 3.8%. In 2022, the United States retained fourth place in the world in terms of R&D intensity, behind the leadership of Israel, South Korea and Taiwan, but ahead of Germany in 2019, as well as subsequently Japan and Sweden.[7] A common indicator of scientific results and performance is the publication of original peer-reviewed research articles in scientific journals. The US maintains leadership on this indicator in the world, although its level as a whole fell in 2022 and 2023 for the first time in decades. In second place is China. The second most common proxy for measuring innovation is patents, where the United States in total is significantly inferior to the patent activity of the PRC — in 2022, the largest number of existing patents in the world was registered in China — about 4.2 million against 3.3 million in the United States.[8]

Under the presidency of J. Biden, overall R&D funding was increased in the field of breakthrough technologies transforming the country's economy — artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, as well as the modernization of next-generation weapons systems. One of the priorities of strategic innovation policy development in the overall context of economic progress measures has been to maximize the return to the United States of the production needed to provide critical supply chains, primarily semiconductors, to develop and apply less costly advanced resource-intensive energy generation technologies, and to achieve global leadership in addressing the impact of the growing global climate crisis [12]. Increased attention was paid to the creation of a US-controlled international regulatory system that would prevent the transfer of advanced technologies to unfriendly countries, mainly to China. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council was established. The Council developed a so-called roadmap on global economic and technological issues. An agreement was reached between the U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute and the relevant structures of England on a common approach to the safe development of AI. Measures were taken to integrate R&D into the structure of bilateral cooperation with India. The United States — India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) program was launched. Initiatives were implemented with Singapore, South Korea and other partners of the United States.

The Democrats, considering the PRC as the most important strategic competitor in the United States, proceeded from the fact that vigorous competition with China, however, does not mean a desire for conflict. A firm commitment to a tough, but smart, attitude towards China is based on the persistent promotion of American interests and values, while ensuring the so-called bottom of stability in relations with China. Minimizing the risk of the flow of advanced technologies from the United States to China, "displacing" China from the innovative global economy of the 21st century, should be carried out through diversification of economic relations between the two countries, but not through the "separation" of their economies. China's ban on access in the United States to most innovations, primarily in the development of chips for AI technologies, the production of next-generation semiconductors, and developments in the field of quantum computing, should take place in parallel with cooperation where it is in the interests of the United States. In particular, in the creation of technologies to combat climate change and trade in fentanyl, as well as the safe use of AI.[9] Further unwinding the spiral of conflict with China is expensive and not in the interests of the United States. The United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and China adopted more than 150 policy recommendations to fundamentally reset the US economic and technological rivalry with China.

The programmatic position of the Republicans comes from the statement of the serious decline of the United States as a nation as a whole, when the future of the country, its identity, and the way of life itself are threatened more than ever before. As a party of industry, production, infrastructure and workers, resolutely distancing themselves from the "blind faith in the song of the sirens of

[7] The State of Sate Technology Policy 2024 Report. URL: https://csmapnyu.org/impact/policy/the-state-of-state-technology-policy-2024-report (accessed on 17.01.2025).

[8] WIPO Patent Search by Region. URL: https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/ips-search/patent; How to Use the US Patents Database for Tech Inventions. URL: https://www.wipo.int›ipstats›news›news_0004 (accessed on 02.02.2025).

[9] The China Challenge: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition by the Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations. Project of the 21st Century China Center under the auspices of the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy. November 16, 2020. URL: https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf (accessed on 29.10.2024).

globalism", Republicans see economic progress in a decisive way in measures to halt inflation and return jobs to the country's industry.[10] Achieving global leadership in developing advanced high-tech industries, in particular, provides for the lifting of restrictions on the development of AI technologies introduced by J. Biden, the revival of the domestic industrial base, priority attention to critical defense industries and investments in advanced R&D. Including technologies for the creation of the Iron Dome missile shield, a developed production industry in Earth orbit, orbiting the Moon, and further to Mars, as well as strengthening partnerships with the rapidly expanding commercial space sector in order to develop assets in Space.

Continuity of consensus on innovation policies

Over the past few years, two presidential administrations — Republican and Democratic — and a bipartisan majority in Congress have taken a series of actions to improve US technological competitiveness. Their primary target was China. In 2021, the Frontiers in Science and Innovation Policy (FSIP) program was launched to activate the organization of basic research and innovation in the face of growing competition with China for leadership in high-tech industries. The three main priorities of the US strategic approach to science and technology policy are as follows: maximizing the extraction of advantages from the global research system in the field of innovative technologies, clearly defining the boundaries where the United States should lead in high-tech areas to ensure the country's national security, and where it is permissible for this to increase the participation of the United States in global innovative cooperation. In 2021, the Law on Innovation and Competition was adopted.[11] The Democratic administration of J. Biden imposed export controls, limiting China's access to advanced semiconductor technologies. In October 2022, the first set of these controls was announced, and in 2023, additional restrictions were announced to close vulnerabilities in earlier measures. Also in 2023, the Democratic president issued a decree restricting US investment in several Chinese sectors, without ruling out extending these investment restrictions to additional sectors of the Chinese economy. The US Congress passed The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, IIJA and The CHIPS and Science Act by bipartisan consensus. China has retaliated by imposing export restrictions on certain materials used in semiconductor manufacturing. Through grants, subsidies, and tax credits, bills have earmarked billions of dollars in areas considered critical to the economic future of the United States, including semiconductor manufacturing, clean energy, AI, and quantum computing. In particular, the allotments reinforce the concept of "local policy" by sending about $ 80 billion to cities and counties throughout the country. The U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Science Foundation (NSF) programs are specifically aimed at improving technological competitiveness by investing in certain geographical areas of the country. The field delegation of technology policies, a geographically oriented investment approach, includes focused efforts to improve economic performance in specific areas. Despite its popularity after World War II, in the 1980s, this approach yielded to more cost-effective national and regional strategies. However, to date, geographical economic differences have increased, partly due to the fact that highly educated workers are concentrating in an increasing number of American cities.

Despite bipartisan support in the US Congress, the laws did not remove political differences between Republicans and Democrats over the future of US innovation policy. Many programs have indeed received funding, but far from in full, the size of which will continue to be discussed in a broader debate in Congress about general federal spending and the ceiling of public debt.

The bipartisan consensus of the US Congress, however, does not always take place on the issue of highly professional immigration. In the past, proposals for a "startup visa" enjoyed bipartisan support; politicians of both parties recognized the economic advantages associated with attracting entrepreneurs from other countries to the United States. Nearly two thirds of the leading AI

[10] The Republican Party Platform, 2024. URL: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2024-republican-party-platform (accessed on 22.12.2024).

[11] United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021. URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1260 (accessed on 16.12.2024).

companies in the United States have immigrant founders or co-founders. In the foreseeable future, the development of AI technologies will largely depend on immigrants: their 70% among graduate students studying in the field of AI at the country's universities and more than 80% among doctoral students performing R&D in the field of computer and information sciences, electrical and computer engineering. Although immigrants account for 16% of all US inventors, they account for 23% of total innovation. Known interparty contradictions in the approach to the issue of highly skilled immigration to a certain extent prompted the federal authorities to delegate solutions to this problem to the state level, rightly believing that local immigration policies could better contribute to more effective investments, in particular in regional technology and innovation centers.

Prospects for a bipartisan approach to US innovation policy

On May 21, 2024, the US Senate unveiled a bipartisan roadmap laying the foundation for AI legislation. On May 15, 2024, the Bipartisan Senate Artificial Intelligence Working Group released the Bipartisan Senate AI Policy Roadmap document to identify bipartisan solutions to address the potentially profound effects of AI on the US economy and national security of the country.[12] Eight sections of the document — innovation in the field of AI in the USA; AI and labor; high-efficiency use of AI; elections and democracy; confidentiality and liability; transparency, explainability, intellectual property and copyright; protection against AI risks; national security and AI. The roadmap identifies key areas that will allow the United States to maximize AI benefits and minimize risks, while keeping pace with its strategic competitors, such as China — from promoting a national system of autonomous vehicles to significant new federal investments in AI [13].

It is recommended to support federal investments in AI, including an increase to $ 32 billion for annual research and development in the field of non-defense AI. It is proposed to allocate emergency allocations to fill the deficit, as well as to conduct a coordinated interdepartmental policy to support research and development in the field of AI with the participation of standing committees of the US Congress, including those conducted by small businesses. A concern was expressed that AI could affect jobs throughout the economy. A proposal has been made to develop legislation to promote the training, retraining and development of private sector employees, as well as to improve US immigration legislation for highly qualified workers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). The opportunities for AI to improve the delivery of public services are emphasized; a recommendation is made to congressional committees to look for ways to use federal hiring programs to attract AI talent to the federal service, as well as record the impact of automation on the workforce and monitor these trends over time. It is noted that AI may not allow companies using advanced technologies to properly comply with existing laws in areas such as transparency, explainability, testing and evaluation of R&D, including risks of direct or accidental violation of constitutional rights by AI, threats to public safety or anti-discrimination legislation.

There is also a bipartisan consensus on expanding the funding and portfolio capabilities of the National Science Foundation. Linking investment to regional competitiveness policies, as in the case of technology hubs, can contribute to a more equitable distribution of economic benefits. There is a common approach to understanding the importance of greater investment in science, infrastructure and partnerships with universities, firms and other stakeholders, with increased emphasis on expanding the country's geographical research base and establishing a network of new regional technology hubs.

Key areas of bipartisan consensus have been identified for additional decisions in the area of AI legislation. The roadmap does not call for comprehensive AI regulation, like The EU Artificial Intelligence Act, or for the creation of new federal AI regulators. Rather, the paper encourages the relevant committees to address selected AI policy issues with the clear intention of promoting more fragmented legislation that addresses its various aspects. The roadmap reflects the understanding that the AI value chain includes many participants and that responsibilities and responsibilities must be carefully considered (and distributed) in ac-

[12] U.S. Senate releases roadmap on artificial intelligence. URL: https://www.naco.org/news/us-senate-releases-roadmap-artificial-intelligence (accessed on 28.12.2024).

cordance with the role of the organization in the value chain. The document supports compliance with the "Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF)". The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a means of ensuring more efficient AI management processes and assumes that suppliers in the process of public procurement should receive a more favorable attitude if they comply with the requirements of this concept. The roadmap does not provide for new federal and local laws governing AI, leaving open issues of priority and other actions of the US central executive authorities in matters of AI administrative regulation.

The US federal government spends nearly $ 200 billion annually on research and development. Presidents and Congress, however, rarely agree on how and how much money should be spent on science [14]. In fact, there are two different approaches to funding science — Republicans and Democrats. US science and technology policy can be assessed through the annual R&D budgeting process. In his first congressional budget request in 2017, D. Trump proposed historical cuts in almost every federal science agency, mainly targeting cutting programs related to climate and environmental protection. D. Trump's fiscal policies resembled the conservative orthodoxy of the R. Reagan era, prioritizing military spending over social programs, including R&D [15–19]. However, unlike R. Reagan, D. Trump sought to cut funding for basic research. Congress then rejected almost all of the Republican administration's intentions, deciding on one of the largest increases in federal R&D programs in US history, even without taking into account emergency spending packages funded by government measures to combat the pandemic.

The J. Biden administration has made science and innovation central to its early policy agenda — with appropriate budgets. Relying on a slim democratic majority in Congress, the White House conducted the cited landmark bills that contain important R&D provisions focused on environmental projects, clean energy, and semiconductor manufacturing. Ambitious funding targets for federal science agencies have been announced, with the US National Science Foundation (NSF) doubling its budget from $ 9 billion to more than $ 18 billion over five years. Despite the initial push for research and development, the last two budget proposals of the J. Biden administration offered much less to science. Years of scarce spending and a new Republican majority in the House of Representatives have led to fiscal austerity in Congress. Instead of going for a doubling of the NSF budget, the agency faced an 8% cut in FY 2024, the biggest cut in more than three decades. For fiscal year 2025, which runs from October 1, 2024, to September 30, 2025, the J. Biden administration requested a meager 3% increase in NSF spending, which is billions of dollars less than the level of spending envisaged by the Democratic administration earlier.[13]

The administration of D. Biden has strengthened technological security measures aimed at protecting American innovation [20]. In his first presidency, D. Trump launched The China Initiative, program by the United States Department of Justice in an attempt to prevent China from adopting the results of advanced American R&D. The administration of J. Biden formally ended this Republican program in 2022, but scientific cooperation between the United States and China continued to decline. D. Trump's policy to strengthen America's leadership in the "industries of the future" was continued. The term, coined by the then chief adviser to the Republican President for Science K. Drohemeier, refers to five new technological areas: artificial intelligence, quantum science, advanced production, innovative communications and biotechnology. This approach remained a key element of Democrats innovation policy throughout K. Harris's 2024 presidential campaign, including during her debate with D. Trump.

The authors of the article believe that the new Republican administration of D. Trump in order to increase the country's competitiveness in the field of AI will emphasize the asymmetric advantages of the United States — their status as a center of human capital in the development of AI; the effective use of targeted risk reduction strategies to protect sensitive uses of AI; the benefits of AI

[13] Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Innovation Engines Awards, Catalyzing More Than $ 530 Million to Boost Economic Growth and Innovation in Communities Across America Home. The White House. Briefing Room. Statements and Releases. January 29, 2024. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/29/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-innovation-engines-awards-catalyzing-more-than-530-million-to-boost-economic-growth-and-innovation-in-communities-across-america/ (accessed on 30.10.2024).

technologies in big data processing; building a large-scale AI ecosystem, including through standards and platforms. With the main emphasis on breakthrough technologies in the field of AI, the course that took shape in the first presidency of D. Trump will continue. The Republican administration of D. Trump became the first in the history of the United States, which in 2018 in Washington at the summit "Artificial Intelligence for American Industry" identified artificial intelligence as a national priority [21, 22]. It is predicted that the bipartisan consensus in the US Congress on innovation policy will remain as a means of ensuring the country's national security. D. Trump, in his first presidency, strengthened the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical infrastructure, upgraded the status of the US Cyber Command to the Joint Combat Command to strengthen cyber operations in cyberspace, which streamlined governance processes and provided funding for expanded cyber operations, identified China as a central threat to cybersecurity, took measures to protect the supply chains of information and communication technologies and services", authorized the Commerce Department to limit the use of technologies that are considered a threat to US national security.

In 2018, the White House issued a memorandum specifically dedicated to cybersecurity in space. The document emphasizes the critical role that space systems play in national security, economic prosperity and technological progress. It recognizes the growing threat of cyberattacks on systems such as communications, navigation and weather monitoring. The memorandum, in line with the administration's emphasis on industrial empowerment, encourages cooperation between government and industry to share information, develop best practices and ensure a coordinated response to cyberattacks. On December 20, 2019, D. Trump approved the US Space Force as the sixth type of armed forces, which became recognition of space as a critical area for national security and maintaining US dominance in space technology. The status of the Space Command was upgraded to a single combat command as part of the creation of the Space Force. In 2019, D. Trump passed a decree "On maintaining American leadership in the field of artificial intelligence", formulating a national AI strategy in the interests of ensuring US dominance in this area. In 2020, a decree was signed "Promoting the use of reliable AI in the federal government". The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is being established as the central body for coordinating federal AI research and development efforts with broad powers to protect critical infrastructure, ensure cyberspace security and improve communications in emergencies.

Conclusion

The bipartisan consensus of the Republican and Democratic parties on innovation policy takes place against a general background of generally constructive interaction between Congress and the White House administration, regardless of the specific alignment of the political forces represented in them. The authors of the study concluded that such a political phenomenon is due to objective reasons for the attitude of the US leadership to technological innovation as one of the key elements in ensuring the country's national security by maintaining leading positions in the global geopolitical competition of the 21st century. Both parties proceed from the priority of the tasks of the legislative and executive branches to create conditions for building up the national dual-use innovation system, involving government as an active partner with industry in support of R&D and domestic production, tighter regulation of many technological areas, and advocating the development of a new prohibitive and inherently restrictive approach to global high-tech cooperation with the aim of strategically deterring China in this direction. At the same time, significant differences remain in the positions of both parties, in particular, regarding high-tech immigration to the United States.

Objective analysis of the evolution of US innovation policy in recent decades [23–26] makes it reasonable to assert that that the re-election of D. Trump as president of the United States, combined with Republican control over both houses of Congress within the framework of the "America First" philosophy in the near term, could lead to a significant acceleration in the pace of technological progress in the United States, with a focus on AI R&D and further cybersecurity measures, even considering the well-known bureaucratic nature of many programs, which prevents, in particular, the implementation of projects to move chip

production to the United States. The Republican administration will prioritize accelerating AI innovations that could hamper U.S. competitiveness by removing regulatory barriers imposed by the previous Democratic administration by J. Biden largely because of ethical considerations.[14]

Given the complexity and urgency of China's problem, the strategy of sound risk management will continue. To remain truly competitive, American firms will operate globally, localize R&D to meet the needs of various fast-growing markets, and hire the best talents wherever they are available [27–29]. Global operations, including in China, will support economic activity and job creation in the United States. National security innovations, especially dual-use technologies, funding for basic scientific research, as well as R&D in three areas of technological innovation: 5G, AI and biotechnology, will receive further expansion. The idea of creating an international consortium with US allies and partners to determine technological policies toward China, as well as establish common ethical principles for conducting research, will receive advancement. The work on risk management of international cooperation in the field of advanced technologies is intensified [30–33].

In the future, the expansion of the bipartisan consensus of the Republican and Democratic parties of the United States is seen precisely within the framework of innovative policies in the development of advanced dual-use and AI technologies, protecting data privacy, cybersecurity and strengthening the digital infrastructure of the country as a whole, quantum computers, 6G technologies, high-capacity batteries. Several initiatives are being studied in Congress, supported by both parties, which may be considered as a matter of priority as soon as possible, including digital identification measures to combat Internet fraud, support for next-generation cybersecurity and digital supply chain security training.

[14] Fact Sheet: President Biden Issues Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. The White House. Briefing Room. Statements and Releases. October 30, 2023. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/30/fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-executive-order-on-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence/ (accessed on 01.11.2024).

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